1,2 . In July 2016, mosquito-borne ZIKV transmission was first reported in the continental United States and since then, hundreds of locally-acquired infections have been reported in Florida 3 . To gain insights into the timing, source, and likely route(s) of introduction of ZIKV into the continental United States, we tracked the virus from its first detection in Miami, Florida by direct sequencing of ZIKV genomes from infected patients and Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. We show that at least four distinct ZIKV introductions contributed to the outbreak in Florida and that local transmission likely started in the spring of 2016 -several months before its initial detection. By analyzing surveillance and genetic data, we discovered that ZIKV moved among transmission zones in Miami. Our analyses show that most introductions are phylogenetically linked to the Caribbean, a finding corroborated by the high incidence rates and traffic volumes from the region into the Miami area. By comparing mosquito abundance and travel flows, we describe the areas of southern Florida that are especially vulnerable to ZIKV introductions. Our study provides a deeper understanding of how ZIKV initiates and sustains transmission in new regions.
Using mosquito surveillance data, we determined the extent of mosquito-borne ZIKV transmission in Miami. Of the 24,351 mosquitoes collected throughout Miami-Dade County from June to November 2016, 99.8% were Ae. aegypti and 8 pools of Ae. aegypti collected in Miami Beach tested positive for ZIKV RNA (Fig. 1c, Supplementary Fig. 1 ). From these pools, we estimated that ~1 out of 1,600 Ae. aegypti mosquitoes were infected (0.061%, 95% CI: 0.028-0.115%, Supplementary Fig. 1a ). This is similar to reported Ae. aegypti infection rates during DENV and CHIKV outbreaks 21 . Even though ZIKV-infected mosquitoes were not detected outside Miami Beach (Fig. 1c) , we found that the number of human ZIKV cases correlated strongly with Ae. aegypti abundance within each of the defined transmission zones (Spearman r = 0.61, Fig. 1d, Supplementary Fig. 1b ). This suggests that Ae. aegypti mosquitoes were the primary mode of transmission throughout Miami-Dade County and that changes to vector abundance directly impacted human infection rates. The application of insecticides 3 , which we found suppressed local mosquito populations during the periods of intensive usage ( Supplementary Fig. 1c ), therefore likely contributed to the clearance of ZIKV within these zones.
To gain molecular insights into the Florida outbreak, we sequenced 39 ZIKV genomes directly from clinical and mosquito samples without cell culture enrichment 22 (Supplementary File 1). Our Florida ZIKV dataset (36 genomes) included 29 genomes from patients with locally-acquired infections (Fig. 1d ) and 7 from Ae. aegypti mosquito pools (Fig. 1c) . We also sequenced 3 ZIKV genomes from travel-associated cases diagnosed in Florida. Our dataset included cases from all three transmission zones in Miami (Fig. 1d) and represented ~11% of all confirmed locally-acquired cases in Florida. We made all sequence data openly available at NCBI (BioProjects PRJNA342539, PRJNA356429) and other online resources immediately after data generation.
To infer viral genealogies, we reconstructed phylogenetic trees from our 39 ZIKV genomes along with 65 published genomes from other affected regions (Fig. 2, Supplementary Fig. 2 and 3 ). We found that the Florida ZIKV genomes formed four distinct lineages (labeled F1-F4, Fig. 2a) , three of which (F1-F3) belonged to the same major clade (labeled A, Fig. 2a) . We only sampled a single human case each from the F3 and F4 lineages, consistent with limited transmission (Fig. 2a) . The other two Florida lineages (F1-F2) comprised ZIKV genomes sequenced from multiple human and mosquito samples within Miami-Dade County (Fig. 2b) . Using time-structured phylogenies 23 , we estimated that at least four separate introductions were responsible for the locally-acquired cases observed in our dataset. The phylogenetic placement of lineage F4 clearly indicates that it resulted from an independent introduction of a lineage genetically distinct from those in clade A (Fig. 2a) . For the two well-supported nodes linking lineages F1 and F2 (labeled B, Fig. 2a ) and F1-F3 (A, Fig. 2a) , we estimated the time of the most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) to be during the summer of 2015. Our data displayed a strong clock signal ( Supplementary Fig. 2b ) and tMRCA estimates were robust across a range of different molecular clock and coalescent models (Supplementary Table 1 ). Thus while F1-F3 all belong to clade A, any less than three distinct introductions leading to these lineages would have required undetected transmission of ZIKV in Florida for approximately one year (Fig. 2a) .
To estimate the likelihood of a single ZIKV transmission chain persisting for over a year, we modeled epidemic spread under different assumptions of the basic reproductive number (R 0 ). We calculated R 0 using the locally-acquired and travel-associated case counts in Miami-Dade County, along with the number of observed genetic lineages. Allowing for variability in the percentage of infectious travel-associated cases and for sampling bias across lineages, we estimated an R 0 for Miami-Dade between 0.5 and 0.8 ( Supplementary Fig. 4 ). Even at the upper end of this range, the probability of a single transmission chain persisting for over a year is extremely low (~0.5%, Fig. 2c ). This is especially true considering the low Ae. aegypti abundance during the winter months ( Supplementary Fig. 1d ). Given the low probability of longterm persistence, we expect that the ZIKV genomes we sequenced from Florida (F1-F4) were the result of at least four separate introductions. Differences in surveillance practices across areas, combined with the high number of travelassociated cases in Florida (Fig. 1a) , however, likely mean that unsampled ZIKV introductions contributed to the outbreak. To estimate the total number of underlying ZIKV introductions, we modeled epidemic scenarios that resulted in 241 locally-acquired cases within Miami-Dade County, and found that with R 0 values of 0.5-0.8, we expect 17-42 (95% CI 3-63) separate introductions to have contributed to the Miami-Dade outbreak (Fig. 2d) . The majority of these introductions would likely have generated a single secondary case that was undetected in our genetic sampling ( Supplementary Fig. 4a ).
The two main ZIKV lineages, F1 and F2, included the vast majority of genomes we sampled in Florida (92%, Fig. 2a ).
Assuming they represent two independent introductions, we estimated when each of these lineages arrived in Florida. The probability densities for the tMRCAs of both F1 and F2 were centered around March-April, 2016 ( Supplementary Fig. 1d ) and suggests that ZIKV transmission in Florida could have started at least two months prior to its first detection in July 2016 (Fig. 1a) . The dates of the introductions could be more recent if multiple F1 or F2 lineage viruses arrived into Florida independently. However, more than 2 introductions from each lineage would be necessary to substantially change our estimates for the timing of the earliest introduction of ZIKV into Florida.
To better understand the transmission dynamics within Miami, we analyzed our genomic data together with case investigation data from the Florida Department of Health (DOH, Supplementary Table 1) . While spatially distinct, the three ZIKV transmission zones occurred within ~3 miles of each other (Fig. 1c) and we found that the ZIKV infections associated with each zone overlapped temporally (Fig. 1d) . Our 22 ZIKV genomes with zone assignments all belonged to lineages F1 and F2, but neither of these lineages were confined to a single transmission zone (Fig. 2b) . In fact, we detected both F1 and F2 lineage viruses from Ae. aegypti collected from the same trap 26 days apart (mosquitoes 5 and 8, Fig. 2b ). The detection of genetically similar viruses and the temporal overlap of ZIKV infections suggest that ZIKV moved among areas of Miami.
Given that ZIKV transmission is unlikely to persist through the winter in Florida 25 ( Fig. 2c, Supplementary Fig. 1d ), determining the sources and routes of ZIKV introductions could help mitigate future outbreaks. We found that lineages F1-F3 clustered with ZIKV genomes sequenced from the Dominican Republic and Guadeloupe (Fig. 2, Supplementary  Fig. 2 and 3 ). In contrast, the F4 lineage clustered with genomes from Central America (Fig. 2, Supplementary Fig. 2  and 3 ). These findings suggest that while ZIKV outbreaks occurred throughout the Americas, the Caribbean islands appear to have been the main source of ZIKV that resulted in local transmission in Florida. Because of the severe undersampling of ZIKV genomes from across the Americas, however, we cannot rule out other source areas or panmixis of the ZIKV population in the region. Similarly, even though we found that the Florida ZIKV genomes clustered together with sequences from the Dominican Republic, our results do not prove that ZIKV entered Florida from this country.
We investigated ZIKV infection rates and travel patterns to corroborate our phylogenetic evidence for Caribbean introductions into Florida. We found that the Caribbean islands bore the highest ZIKV incidence rates around the likely time of the main introductions into Florida (Fig. 2b) , despite Brazil and Colombia reporting the highest absolute number of ZIKV cases (January to June, 2016, Fig. 3a, Supplementary Fig. 5, Supplementary File 2) . During the same time period, ~3 million travelers arriving from the Caribbean accounted for 54% of the total traffic into Miami, with the vast majority (~2.4 million) arriving via cruise ships (Fig. 3b, Supplementary Fig. 6, Supplementary File 2) . Combining the infection rates with travel capacities, we estimated that ~60-70% of ZIKV infected travelers entering Miami arrived from the Caribbean (Fig. 3c and Supplementary Fig. 7a ). In support of these estimates, we found that the observed number of travel-associated ZIKV cases correlated strongly with the expected number of importations from the Caribbean (Spearman r = 0.8, Fig. 3d, Supplementary Fig. 7b ). Also, 67% of the travel-associated infections diagnosed in Florida reported recent travel to the Caribbean (Fig. 3e) ; however, the mode of travel for these cases is unknown. Taken together, these findings suggest that a high incidence of ZIKV in the Caribbean, combined with frequent travel from the region, could have played a key role in the establishment of ZIKV transmission in Florida in the spring of 2016. These findings, however, do not indicate that cruise ships themselves are risk factors for human ZIKV infection, but only that they served as a major mode of transportation from areas with active transmission. In addition, the probability of ZIKV exposure may vary among individuals depending on their purpose of travel and therefore, we cannot determine the specific contribution of ZIKV-infected travelers arriving via airlines or cruise ships. The vast majority of the Florida ZIKV outbreak occurred in Miami-Dade County (94% of reported local cases in Florida, Fig. 1b ). To determine if there is a higher potential for ZIKV outbreaks in the Miami area, we analyzed incoming passenger traffic by air and sea from regions with ZIKV transmission and Ae. aegypti abundance. We found that Miami and nearby Fort Lauderdale received ~72% of the traffic entering Florida (Fig. 4) and Miami received more air and sea traffic than any other city in the continental United States in 2016 ( Supplementary Fig. 8 ). During January to April 2016, we estimated that Ae. aegypti abundance was highest in southern Florida 20 ( Fig. 4 , Supplementary Fig. 1d , Supplementary Fig. 8 ). By June, most of Florida and several cities across the South, such as New Orleans, Atlanta, and Charleston, were expected to support high seasonal Ae. aegypti populations 20 ( Supplementary Fig. 8 ); however, none of these cities have reported local Ae. aegypti-borne transmission of any virus in at least 60 years 17 . In fact, despite the thousands of opportunities for introductions across the country (Fig. 1a) , the only region outside of Florida that has reported mosquito-borne ZIKV transmission is southern Texas 27 . Southern Texas is also the only other region to recently report DENV outbreaks [17] [18] [19] . Therefore, the combination of international travelers, mosquito ecology, and human population density near Miami likely make it one of the few places in the continental United States most at risk for Ae. aegypti-borne virus outbreaks 20, 24, 26 . (136) 13 . Given that the majority of ZIKV infections are asymptomatic 2, 28 , the true number of ZIKV cases was likely much higher. Despite this, we estimated that the average R 0 was less than 1 and therefore multiple introductions were necessary to give rise to the magnitude of the observed outbreak 25 . The high volume of airline and cruise ship traffic entering Florida from ZIKV-affected regions, especially the Caribbean, likely provided a substantial supply of ZIKV-infected individuals 29, 30 . Because Florida is unlikely to sustain long-term ZIKV transmission 25 , the potential for future ZIKV outbreaks in this region is highly dependent upon activity elsewhere. Therefore, we expect that outbreaks in Florida will cycle with the ZIKV transmission dynamics in the Americas 12 .
Miami 
Florida Zika virus case data
Weekly reports of international travel-associated and locally-acquired ZIKV infections diagnosed in Florida were obtained from the Florida DOH mosquito-borne disease surveillance system 13 . Dates of symptom onset from the Miami transmission zones (Wynwood, Miami Beach, and Little River) determined by the Florida DOH investigation process were obtained from the ZIKV resource website 31 and daily updates 32 . International travel-associated ZIKV case counts in the United States (outside of Florida) were obtained from the CDC 33 . The local and travel-associated ZIKV case numbers for Florida were obtained from the Florida DOH. The one local ZIKV infection diagnosed in Duval County was believed to have originated elsewhere in Florida. Therefore, this case is listed as "unknown origin" in Fig. 1b . In Fig. 3e , only the countries visited 5 or more times by ZIKV-infected travelers diagnosed in Florida are shown. Countries with 5 or less visits were aggregated into an "other" category by region (i.e., Caribbean, South America, or Central America).
Clinical sample collection
Clinical samples from locally-acquired ZIKV infections were collected from June 22 to October 11, 2016. The Florida DOH identified persons with compatible illness and clinical samples were shipped to the Bureau of Public Health Laboratories for confirmation by qRT-PCR and antibody tests following interim guidelines 3, [34] [35] [36] . Clinical specimens (whole blood, serum, saliva, or urine) submitted for analysis were refrigerated or frozen at ≤ -70°C until RNA was extracted. RNA was extracted using the RNAeasy kit (QIAGEN), MagMAX for Microarrays Total RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion), or MagNA Pure LC 2.0 or 96 Systems (Roche Diagnostics). Purified RNA was eluted into 50-100 µL using the supplied elution buffers, immediately frozen at ≤ -70°C, and transported on dry ice. The Florida DOH also provided investigation data for these samples, including symptom onset dates and, when available, assignments to the zone where infection likely occurred (Supplementary File 1). 24, 351 Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes (sorted into 2,596 pools) were collected throughout Miami-Dade County during June to November, 2016 using BG-Sentinel mosquito traps (Biogents AG). Up to 50 mosquitoes of the same species and sex were pooled per trap. The pooled mosquitoes were stored in RNAlater (Invitrogen), RNA was extracted using either the RNAeasy kit (QIAGEN) or MagMAX for Microarrays Total RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion), and ZIKV RNA was detected by qRT-PCR targeting the envelope protein coding region 36 or the Trioplex qRT-PCR kit 37 . ZIKV infection rates were calculated per 1,000 female Ae. aegypti mosquitoes using the bias-corrected maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) 38 . Days of insecticide usage by the Miami-Dade Mosquito Control were inferred from the zone-specific ZIKV activities timelines published by the Florida DOH 31 .
Mosquito collection and entomological data analysis

Relative monthly Ae. aegypti abundance
For the purpose of this study we used Ae. aegypti suitability maps from Kraemer et al. 11 and derived monthly estimates based on the statistical relationships between mosquito presence and environmental correlates 41 . Following Hwang et al. 42 we used a simple mathematical formula to transform the probability of detection maps into mosquito abundance maps. In order to do so, we assumed P (Y=1) where Y is a binary variable (presence/absence). Using a Poisson distribution X() to govern the abundance of mosquitoes, the probability of not observing any mosquitoes can be related to the probability of absence as: P(X=0)=P(Y=0). We used the following transformation to generate abundance (λ) estimates per county in Florida:
Zika virus quantification
ZIKV genome equivalents (GE) were quantified by qRT-PCR. At TSRI, ZIKV qRT-PCR was performed as follows: ZIKV RNA standards were transcribed from the ZIKV NS5 region (8651-9498 nt) using the T7 forward primer (5' -TAA TAC GAC TCA CTA TAG GGA GA TCA GGC TCC TGT CAA AAC CC -3'), reverse primer (5' -AGT GAC AAC TTG TCC GCT CC -3'), and the T7 Megascript kit (Ambion). For qRT-PCR, primers and a probe targeting the NS5 region (9014-9123 nt) were designed using the ZIKV isolate PRVABC59 (GenBank: KU501215): forward primer (5'-AGT GCC AGA GCT GTG TGT AC -3'), reverse primer (5' -TCT AGC CCC TAG CCA CAT GT -3'), and FAM-fluorescent probe (5' -GGC AGC CGC GCC ATC TGG T -3'). We have the best probes. The qRT-PCR assays were performed in 25 µl reactions using the iScript One-step RT-PCR Kit for probes (Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc.) and 2 µl of sample RNA. Amplification was performed at 50°C for 20 min, 95°C for 3 min, and 40 cycles of 95°C for 10 s and 57°C for 10 s. Fluorescence was read at the end of the 57°C annealing-extension step. 10-fold dilutions of the ZIKV RNA transcripts (2 µl/reaction) were used to create a standard curve for quantification of ZIKV GE/µl of RNA.
ZIKV GE were quantified at USAMRIID using the University of Bonn ZIKV envelope protein (Bonn E) qRT-PCR assay 43 . RNA standards were transcribed using an amplicon generated from a ZIKV plasmid containing T7 promoter at the start of the 5' untranslated region (UTR). The plasmid was designed using the ZIKV isolate BeH819015 (GenBank: KU365778.1) and the amplicon included nts 1-4348, which covers the 5' UTR, C, prM, M, E, NS1, and NS2 regions. The qRT-PCR assays were performed in 25 µl reactions using the SuperScript III platinum One-step qRT-PCR Kit (ThermoFisher) and 2 µl of sample RNA was used. Amplification was performed following conditions as previously described 43 . 10-fold dilutions of the ZIKV RNA transcripts (5 µl/reaction) were used to create a standard curve for quantification of ZIKV GE/µl of RNA.
Amplicon-based Zika virus sequencing
ZIKV sequencing at TSRI was performed using an amplicon-based approach using the ZikaAsian V1 scheme, as described 22 . Briefly, cDNA was reverse transcribed from 5 µl of RNA using SuperScript IV (Invitrogen). ZIKV cDNA (2.5 µl/reaction) was amplified in 35 × 400 bp fragments from two multiplexed PCR reactions using Q5 DNA Highfidelity Polymerase (New England Biolabs). The amplified ZIKV cDNA fragments (50 ng) were prepared for sequencing using the Kapa Hyper prep kit (Kapa Biosystems) and SureSelect XT2 indexes (Agilent). Agencourt AMPure XP beads (Beckman Coulter) were used for all purification steps. Paired-end 251 nt reads were generated on the MiSeq using the V2 500 cycle or V3 600 cycle kits (Illumina).
Trimmomatic was used to remove primer sequences (first 22 nt from the 5' end of the reads, which is the maximum length of the primers used for the multiplexed PCR) and bases at both ends with Phred quality score < 20 44 . The reads were then aligned to the complete genome of a ZIKV isolate from the Dominican Republic, 2016 (GenBank: KU853012) using Novoalign v3.04.04 (www.novocraft.com). Samtools was used to sort the aligned BAM files and to generate alignment statistics 45 . Snakemake was used as the workflow management system 46 . The code and reference indexes for the pipeline can be found at https://github.com/andersen-lab/zika-pipeline. ZIKV-aligned reads were visually inspected using Geneious v9.1.5 47 before generating consensus sequences. A minimum of 3× read-depth coverage, in support of the consensus, was required to make a base call.
The consensus ZIKV sequences from FL01M and FL03M generated by sequencing 35 × 400 bp amplicons on the MiSeq were validated using the following approaches: 1) sequencing the 35 × 400 bp amplicons on the Ion S5 platform (ThermoFisher), 2) sequencing amplicons generated using an Ion AmpliSeq® (ThermoFisher) panel customly targeted towards ZIKV on the Ion S5 platform, and 3) sequencing 5 × 2,150-2,400 bp ZIKV amplicons on the MiSeq. For Ion library preparation, cDNA was synthesized using the SuperScript VILO kit (ThermoFisher). ThermoFisher designed 875 custom ZIKV primers to produce 75 amplicons of ~200 bp in two PCR reactions for use with their Ion AmpliSeq Library Kit 2.0. The reagent FuPa was used to digest the modified primer sequences after amplification. The DNA templates were loaded onto Ion 520 chips using the Ion Chef and sequenced on the Ion S5 with the 200 bp output (ThermoFisher). The 35 × 400 bp amplicons generated for the MiSeq as described above were introduced into the Ion workflow using the Ion AmpliSeq Library Kit 2.0, but without fragmentation. Primers to amplify 2,150-2,400 bp ZIKV fragments (Supplementary File 3) were kindly provided by Shelby O'Connor, Dawn Dudly, Dave O'Connor, and Dane Gellerup (AIDS Vaccine Research Laboratory, University of Wisconsin, Madison). Each fragment was amplified individually by PCR using the cDNA generated above, Q5 DNA High-fidelity Polymerase, and the following thermocycle conditions: 55 ℃ for 30 m, 94 ℃ for 2 m, 35 cycles of 94 ℃ for 15 s, 56 ℃ for 30 s, and 68 ℃ for 3.5 m, 68 ℃ for 10 m, and held at 4 ℃ until use. Each PCR product was purified using Agencourt AMPure XP beads, sheared to 300 to 400 nt fragments using the Covaris S2 sonicator, indexed and prepared for sequencing as described above, and sequenced using the MiSeq V2 500 cycle kit (paired-end 251 nt reads). Compared to the consensus sequences generated using 35 × 400 bp amplicons on the MiSeq, there were no consensus-level mismatches in the coding sequence using any of the other three approaches (Supplementary Table 2 ). There were, however, some mismatches in the 5' and 3' UTRs (where the genomic RNA is heavily structured), likely a result of PCR bias and decreased coverage depth.
Enrichment-based Zika virus sequencing
ZIKV sequencing at USAMRIID was performed using a targeted enrichment approach. Sequencing libraries were prepared using the TruSeq RNA Access Library Prep kit (Illumina) with custom ZIKV probes. The set included 866 unique probes each of which was 80 nt in length (Supplementary File 3) . The probes were designed to cover the entire ZIKV genome and to encompass the genetic diversity present on GenBank on January 14, 2016. In total, 26 ZIKV sequences were used during probe design (Supplementary File 3) . Extracted RNA was fragmented at 94 ˚C for 0-60 s and each sample was enriched separately using a quarter of the reagents specified in the manufacturer's protocol. Samples were barcoded, pooled and sequenced using the MiSeq Reagent kit v3 (Illumina) on an Illumina MiSeq with a minimum of 2 × 151 bp reads. Dual indexing, with no overlapping indices, was used.
The random hexamer associated with read one and the Illumina adaptors were removed from the sequencing reads using Cutadapt v1.9.dev1 48 , and low-quality reads/bases were filtered using Prinseq-lite v0.20.3 49 . Reads were aligned to a reference genome (GenBank: KX197192.1) using Bowtie2 v2.0.6 50 , duplicates were removed with Picard (http://broadinstitute.github.io/picard), and a new consensus was generated using a combination of Samtools v0.1.18 45 and custom scripts (https://github.com/jtladner/Scripts/blob/master/reference-based_assembly/consensus_fasta.py). Only bases with Phred quality score ≥ 20 were utilized in consensus calling, and a minimum of 3× read-depth coverage, in support of the consensus, was required to make a call; positions lacking this depth of coverage were treated as missing (i.e. called as ''N'').
Phylogenetic analyses
All published and available complete ZIKV genomes of the Asian genotype from the Pacific and the Americas were retrieved from GenBank public database as of December 2016. Public sequences (n=65) were codon-aligned together with ZIKV genomes generated in this study (n=39) using MAFFT 51 and inspected manually . The multiple alignment contained 104 ZIKV sequences collected between 2013 and 2016, from the Pacific (American Samoa, French Polynesia, and Tonga), Brazil, other South and Central Americas (Guatemala, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela), the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, and Puerto Rico), and the United States (Supplementary File 1) .
In order to determine the temporal signal of the sequence dataset, a maximum likelihood (ML) phylogeny was first reconstructed with PhyML 52 using the general time-reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution model and gamma distributed rates amongst sites 54 ( Supplementary File 1) , which was identified as the best fitting model for ML inference by jModelTest2 55 . Then, a correlation between root-to-tip genetic divergence and date of sampling was conducted in TempEst 56 .
Bayesian phylogenetic analyses were performed using BEAST v.1.8.4 23 to infer time-structured phylogenies. We used an SDR06 nucleotide substitution model 57 with a non-informative continuous time Markov chain reference prior (CTMC) 58 on the molecular clock rate. Replicate analyses using multiple combinations of molecular clock and coalescent demographic models were explored to select the best fitting model by marginal likelihood comparison using path-sampling and stepping-stone estimation approaches [59] [60] [61] (Supplementary Table 3 ). The best fit model was a strict molecular clock along with a Bayesian skyline demographic model 62 . All the Bayesian analyses were run for 30 million Markov chain Monte Carlo steps, sampling parameters and trees every 3000 generations (BEAST XML file and MCC tree available in Supplementary File 1) .
Expected number and distribution of local cases from Zika virus importations
We used branching process theory 63, 64 to generate the offspring distribution (subsequent local cases) that is expected from a single introduction. The offspring distribution L is modelled with a negative binomial distribution with mean R 0 and over-dispersion parameter k. The total number of cases j that is caused by a single importation (including the index case) after an infinite time 65 has the following form:
The parameter k represents the variation in the number of secondary cases generated by each case of ZIKV 63 . In the case of vector borne diseases, local heterogeneity is high due to a variety of factors such as mosquito population abundance, human to mosquito interaction, and control interventions 66, 67 . Here, we assumed high heterogeneity (k=0.1) following previous estimates for vector borne diseases 64 . This distribution L is plotted in Supplementary Fig. 4a . For the following, we took a forward simulation approach, drawing random samples from this distribution. All estimates were based on 100,000 random simulations.
We used this formula to estimate the probability of observing 241 local cases in Miami-Dade County alongside 320 travel-associated cases. We approached this by sampling 320 introduction events from L and calculating the total number of local cases in the resulting outbreak ( Supplementary Fig. 4b ). We also calculated the likelihood of observing 241 local cases in the total outbreak ( Supplementary Fig. 4c ), finding that the MLE of R 0 lies between 0.35 and 0.55. As a sensitivity analysis, we additionally modelled introductions with the assumption that only 50% of travelers were infectious at time of arrival into Miami-Dade County, resulting in an MLE of R 0 of 0.45-0.8.
We further used this formula to address the probability of observing 3 distinct genetic clusters (F1, F2 and F3) representing 3 introduction events in a sample of 27 ZIKV genomes from Miami-Dade County. We approached this by sampling introduction events until we accumulated 241 local cases according to L, arriving at N introduction events with case counts (j 1 , j 2 , … j N ). We then sampled 27 cases without replacement from (j 1 , j 2 , … j N ) following a hypergeometric distribution and recorded the number of distinct clusters drawn in the sample. We found that higher values of R 0 resulted in fewer distinct clusters within the sample of 27 genomes (Supplementary Fig. 4d ). We additionally calculated the likelihood of sampling 3 distinct genetic clusters in 27 genomes ( Supplementary Fig. 4e ), finding an MLE estimate of R 0 of 0.7-0.9. Additionally, as a sensitivity analysis we modelled a preferential sampling process in which larger clusters are more likely to be drawn from than smaller clusters. Here, we used a parameter α that enriches the hypergeometric distribution following (j 1 α , j 2 α , … j N α ). In this case, we found an MLE estimate of R 0 of 0.5-0.9.
Using the overlap of estimates of R 0 from local case counts (0.35-0.8) and genetic clusters (0.5-0.9), we arrived at a 95% uncertainty range of R 0 of 0.5-0.8.
We additionally perform birth-death stochastic simulations assuming a serial interval with mean 20 days 12 . We record the number of stochastic simulations still persisting after a particular number of days for different values of R 0 (Fig. 2c) .
Incidence and attack rates
Weekly suspected and confirmed ZIKV case counts from countries and territories within the Americas with local transmission (January 1 to September 18, 2016) were obtained from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 68 . In most cases, the weekly case numbers per country were only reported in bar graphs, therefore we used WebPlotDigitizer v3.10 (http://arohatgi.info/WebPlotDigitizer) to estimate the numbers. Country and territory total population sizes to calculate weekly and monthly ZIKV incidence rates were also obtained from PAHO 69 . Incidence rates calculated from countries and territories in the Americas during January to June, 2016 (based on the earliest introduction time estimates until the first known cases) were used as an estimate for infection likelihood to investigate sources of ZIKV introductions.
To account for potential reporting biases with incidence rates, we also used ZIKV attack rates (i.e., proportion infected before epidemic burnout) to estimate infection likelihood. Attack rates were calculated using a susceptible-infectedrecovered (SIR) transmission model derived from seroprevalence studies and environmental factors as described 70 . Using attack rates as an estimate of infection likelihood, we predict that ~60% of the infected travelers entering Miami came from the Caribbean (Supplementary 7b) , which is in agreement with our methods using incidence rates of ~60-70% (Fig. 3c) . A list of countries and territories used in these analyses can be found in Supplementary File 2.
Airline and cruise ship traffic
To investigate whether the transmission of ZIKV in Florida coincides with travel patterns from ZIKV endemic regions, we obtained the number of passengers arriving at airports in Florida via commercial air travel. We collated flight data from countries and territories in the Americas with local ZIKV transmission between January and June, 2016 (based on the earliest introduction time estimates until the first known cases, Supplementary File 2), arriving at all commercial airports in Florida. The data were obtained from the International Air Transportation Association, which collects data on an estimated 90% of all passenger trips worldwide. Nelson et al. 26 previously reported flight data from 33 countries with ZIKV transmission entering major United States airports during October 2014 through September 2015, which we used to assess the potential for ZIKV introductions outside of Florida.
Schedules for cruise ships visiting Miami, Port Canaveral, Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale, Key West, Jacksonville (all in Florida), Houston, Galveston (both in Texas), Charleston (South Carolina) and New Orleans (Louisiana) ports in the year 2016 were collated from www.cruisett.com and confirmed by cross-referencing ship logs reported by Port of Miami and reported ship schedules from www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/. Scheduled cruise ship capacities were extracted from www.cruisemapper.com. Every country/territory with ZIKV transmission visited by a cruise ship 10 days (the approximate mean time to ZIKV clearance in human blood [i.e., the infectious period]) 71 prior to arrival was counted as contributing the ship's capacity worth of passengers to Miami to the month of arrival (Supplementary File 2) .
Expected number of travelers infected with Zika virus
We estimated the expected number of travelers entering Miami who were infected with ZIKV (λ) by using the total travel capacity (C) and the likelihood of ZIKV infection (infections (I) per person (N)) from each country/territory (i):
We summed the number of expected infected travelers from each country/territory with ZIKV transmission by region and travel method (flights or cruises). We reported the data as the relative proportion of infected travelers from each region (Fig. 3c, Supplementary Fig. 7a ) and as the absolute number of infected travelers (Fig. 3d, Supplementary Fig.  7b, Supplementary File 2) . In order to account for potential biases in ZIKV reporting accuracies, we also estimated the proportion of infected travelers using projected ZIKV attack rates 70 (i.e. predicted proportion of population infected before epidemic burnout). About 60% of the infected travelers are expected to have arrived from the Caribbean, similar to our results using incidence rates (Fig. 3c) . Supplementary 
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